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POLITICAL WILL AND THE .UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: WHAT MAKES AN
INDEPENDENT AGENCY
INDEPENDENT?
Neal Devins•

The government does not speak a unitary voice in court. The
exercise of independent litigating authority by governmental entities
connotes the absence of White House authority and, with it, disunity
in interpretation. Sometimes Congress encourages such disunity
through statutory grants of independent litigating authority. Sometimes the executive accommodates the desires of governmental entities to speak their own voice in particular cases. At other times the
executive acknowledges an implicit claim of right for an independent
agency or governmental corporation to control its litigation.
What then defines the line which separates that which is within
the President's control from spheres of authority independent of the
President's will? In a sense, this question puts the cart before the
horse. It assumes that the power to implement the laws can be parcelled out between the President and independent policy makers.
This assumption is an anathema to and rejected by supporters of a
unitary executive. 1 Nonetheless it is appropriate. The Supreme Court
has never accepted and the Solicitor General has never advanced the
strict unitariness claim. 2 Unitariness is not simply a theoretical construct, the figment of someone's imagination. Quite the contrary, perceptions about unitariness define ·White House control of the
administrative state. The more the President constructively asserts
• Professor of Law & Lecturer in Government at the College of William and Mary. I
would like to thank Wendy Watson for her research assistance and insights; John McGinnis
for his guidance; and attorneys who not only participated in the episodes recounted in this
Article but also shared their thoughts with me. I was a consultant to the Postal Service in its
battle with the White House-one of the stories discussed in' this Article. The views expressed
on that and other disputes are solely those of the author.
I See generally TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 161 (1992); DOUGLAS
W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER 47-68 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1155, 1166-69 (1992).
2 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 154-60 (1991); Bernard Schwartz, An Administrative Law "Might Have Been"-ChiefJustice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L.
REv. 221 (1990) (Justices' conference and draft opinions in Bowsher v. Synar reveal overwhelming support for structural restrai~ts on President's power-so long as the execution of
the law is n~t vested in another branch of government).

273

HeinOnline -- 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 273 1993 - 1994

274

. CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 15:273

his Chief Executive status, the greater his power. Along the same
lines, the more Congress or independent agencies perceive the President as the unitary head of government, the greater the President's
power to control the administrative state.
The above proposition seems little more than a restatement of the
obvious. For the most part, however, analysis-at least by legal
scholars-of the breadth and limitations of White House control over
the administrative state has focused on whether or not Congress has
imposed formal structural limits on executive control. 3 In particular,
multimember agencies headed by commissioners who serve staggered
terms and who are not removable at the executive's will are perceived
as having the power to exert an independent voice which may run
afoul of executive wishes. Examination of particular agencies, however, indicates that this analysis is overly simplistic.
This Article suggests an alternative paradigm of agency independence. The focus of agency analysis should encompass interbranch
power and expectations as well as agency structure. Through an assessment of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), the
United States Postal Service, and, in particular, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), this paper argues that the
traditional structural paradigm for determining an agency's independent power is inadequate. Examine the case of the EEOC: Despite
staggered term Commissioners, for-cause removal, lead agency status
in coordinating federal employment antidiscrimination efforts, and independent litigating authority, the Department of Justice-with
White House backing-has successfully exerted extraordinary control
over the EEOC. For example, in a controversial affirmative action
case, the EEOC withdrew from filing an amicus brief counter to the
Justice Department's position. 4
The EEOC example, as will be shown, does not suggest that
structure is irrelevant. Structural limitations are significant, but not
controlling. The willfulness of the President, the Congress, and the
agency itself are equally as important. In the case of the EEOC, the
executive forcefully exerted control over the agency while Congress,
standing on the sidelines, acquiesced to this power grab. In contrast,
the example of the FCC reveals how executive power can be delimited
3 See generally Symposium, Separation of Powers and the Executive Branch: The Reagan
Era in Retrospect, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 401 (1989); Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutiqnal
Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 A,M. U. L. REV. 277 (1987). Cf EASTLAND, supra
note 1, at 383-84 (advancing political strategies for unitariness). ·
4 See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1571 n.l (5th Cir. 1984). For
further discussion, see infra part II.A.l.
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by congressional and agency assertions of power. s Finally, the Postal
Service calls attention to the necessity of strategic planning for the
executive to effectively expand its power. 6
This Article examines the paramount role of political actors in
defining the unitariness of executive branch interpretations. Its specific focus is on Department of Justice control of independent agency
litigation. This issue is of great symbolic and practical importance to
the unitary executive debate. Clearly, "those who control the agenda
will have great opportunity for manipulating the social choice." 7 If
the White House, through the Department of Justice, controls an
agency's access to courts, it therefore controls the court's agenda for
policy making; if an agency controls litigation, it will set its own
agenda.
This Article will examine the question of executive control over
litigation in three phases. Part I will consider structural and political
limitations to Department of Justice control of government litigation.
Part II will examine the intersection between politics and structure
through three case studies. Part II will first assess the Department of
Justice's success in politically overcoming structural limitations to its
authority by neutralizing EEOC independence. In making this assessment, the role of Congress and the EEOC itself, in facilitating this
Department of Justice initiative, will also be considered. Part II will
then examine "turf wars" between the Department of Justice and two
other independent agencies, the Postal Service and the FCC. This
examination will provide insight into the ways in which structure and
politics intersect when defining the line between executive unitariness
and agency independence. Finally, part III will synthesize these case
studies. This synthesis will highlight the limits of the structural paradigm and the centrality of politics.

I.

THE DISUNITARY EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Executive branch centralization is more illusory than real. The
administrative state is far too immense for the White House, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), and the Department of
Justice to comprehensively coordinate policy making. In the area of
civil rights, for example, every government agency, department, and
s See infra part II.B.l.
See infra part II.B.3.
7 DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACfiCE
115-16 (1992) (discussing policy implications of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem). For
an insightful article on Justice Department control of litigation, see Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigation Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 71
(1984).
6
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commission is involved in enforcement. 8 Nondiscrimination in federal assistance requirements are enforced by all government agencies
distributing federal largess; EEOC regulations call for sensitivity by
all government entities to numerical equality objectives in their own
hiring. Moreover, freestanding civil rights enforcement projects exist
within the EEOC, FCC, Small Business Administration, Civil Rights
Commission, Legal Services Corporation, and the Departments of
Treasury, Labor, Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Justice.
Given the pervasiveness of civil rights enforcement, centralization can
occur only if the White House both makes coordination a primary
objective and is extremely diligent in appointing to key government
posts individuals who agree with the President's views on civil rights
enforcement. Otherwise, competing regulatory goals will take priority to civil rights enforcement and, correlatively, external pressures
from oversight committees and constituency interests will dilute the
White House agenda. 9
The apparent impossibility of centralization should not be
equated with government run amok. An "energetic" President can
place his imprimatur on governmental operations through both the
appointment of like-minded individuals and the endorsement of hierarchical Justice Department control of litigation, OMB control of regulation, and White House control of legislative initiatives. 10
Congress, however, can erect roadblocks to centralization efforts.
Threatened funding prQhibitions have hampered aggressive OMB
oversight. 11 Statutory exceptions to Department of Justice litigation
authority have likewise impeded Attorney General efforts to advocate
a unitary executive voice.
A. Structural Limits on Attorney General Control

The authority of the Attorney General to manage government
litigation is certainly the norm. When Congress established the Department of Justice in 1870, it sought to secure "a unity of decision, a
unity of jurisprudence ... in the executive law of the United States." 12
Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1753 (1991).
This is precisely what occurred in the battle over race preferences between the FCC and
the Justice Department. See infra part II.B.
10 For an analysis of the energetic President, see EASTLAND, supra note l, at 277-89;
KMIEC, supra note l, at 47-48. On the pitfalls of an energetic President, see GEORGE C. EADS
& MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? (1984); THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN EXAMINA·
TION Of EcONOMie AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (John L.
Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1982).
II See Judith Havermann, "Defunding" OMB's Rule Reviewers; Hill Panel Deletes $5.4
Million Budget, WASH. PoST, July 18, 1986, at Al7.
12 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870). See generally Olson, supra note 7. See
8

9
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The legislation authorizing the Justice Department set the stage for
massive centralization of government litigation, specifying that
"[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of [government] litigation ... is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." 13 Nevertheless,
the initial caveat of this legislation ("[e]xcept as otherwise authorized
by law") provided enough room for agency empowerment to keep
alive the debate over the appropriate level of Department of Justice
control. Indeed, Congress's power to make exceptions to Department
of Justice control has severely infringed upon the Attorney General's
role as chief litigator for the United States. That Congress would
make such exceptions should come as no surprise. When Department
of Justice centralization frustrates legislative desires, Congress may
protect its prerogatives by transferring litigating authority to an
agency or department that is more likely to endorse its preferences.
Furthermore, legislative grants of independent litigating authority result in a significant number of intragovernmental disputes that
are publicly aired before federal courts, including the Supreme Court.
Congressional exceptions to Department of Justice control, moreover,
lack a coherent pattern. 14 Some entities have independent litigating
authority on all matters before all courts (e.g., the Federal Election
Commission, the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel, and special prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in Government Act); others have
independent litigating authority on some matters before all courts
(e.g., the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Trade Commission). Moreover, some entities have independent litigating authority
on some matters before some courts (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services);
some have independent litigating authority on all matters before some
courts (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, and the Internal Revenue Service); still others have independent litigating authority on some matters before all courts and
on other matters before some courts (e.g., the Federal Communicaalso The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States [hereinafter Attorney General as Chief Litigator], 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982); Neal Devins, Unitariness
and Independence: Solicitor General Control of Independent Agency Litigation, 81 CAL. L.
REv. (forthcoming Dec. 1993).
13 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1988).
14 See Olson, supra note 7; Devins, supra note 12; THE OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MULTI-MEMBER INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY AGENCIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION (hereinafter
PRELIMINARY SURVEY] (rev. ed. May 1992).
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tions Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission). Intragovernmental conflict therefore manifests itself in countless forms
depending on the issue and the court.
Independent litigating authority is not the death knell of Attorney General control, however. Despite significant statutory exceptions, the vast majority <;>f government litigation is conducted by the
Department of Justice. The Justice Department remains dominant
because of the presumed benefits in the quality of representation, the
cohesiveness of governmental arguments, and the bringing of a
greater objectivity to representing the public interest. Grants of independent litigation authority nonetheless pose a severe structural
barrier to Attorney General control, especially when litigating authority is vested in independent agency heads-that is, officials who
may only be dismissed by the President "for cause." Intuitively, administrators and commissioners, secure in their offices, are better able
to defy Executive wishes and assert independent authority. For-cause
removal is controversial for precisely this reason; it envisions and
thereby encourages agency heads to, at least occasionally, engage in
policy disputes with the White House. At a most fundamental level,
immunity froin removal grants administrators the freedom to speak
with an independent voice. 15
Focusing on these structural characteristics, however, places a
heavy emphasis on the role of the executive in shaping agency decision making. The structural paradigm assumes executive control of
federal agencies, and carves out exceptions for agencies with the procedural ability to ward off the executive. Moreover, the structural
paradigm implies that agency independence can be determined by
consulting a checklist of structural characteristics.
The line separating agency independence from Department of
Justice control, of course, is too murky for a checklist. Political institutions transcend their structural characteristics. Political will and
varying circumstances play a critical role in determining whether government presents itself in court as a unitary voice or multiheaded
hydra.
B.

The Problem of Political Will

Fundamentally, the question of whether, and to what extent,
Is As early as 193 7, political commentators warned of the threat posed to the unitary executive by independent agencies; the Brownlow Commission described the independent agency
as a "headless 'fourth branch' of Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies
and uncoordinate powers." PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH
SPECIAL STUDIES 37 (1937).
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government will speak as a unitary voice in court is a question of
representation-namely, do government lawyers litigate on behalf of
Congress, the affected agency or department, or the President. The
most prevalent model, the so-called bureaucratic theory of representation, envisions the affected agent or department as the policy-making
client, and agency counsel or the Justice Department as the dutiful
advocate. 16 Proponents of the unitary executive reject bureaucratic
theories of representation and instead argue that the obligation of government attorneys "is most reasonably seen as runmng to the executive branch as a whole and to the President as its head., 17 Finally, to
the extent that some governmental entities are viewed as "arms of the
Congress,, the desires of oversight committees may figure prominently in government representation. 18
The choice of the representation model is a function of independent litigation authority, removal authority, and other structural attributes. However, political will is the most significant factor in
determining which representation model will predominate. Political
will may manifest itself in several ways. The existence or nonexistence of structural barriers to Justice Department control of litigation
is a by-product of political will. On the one hand, the Nixon and
Carter administrations signed off on the creation of independent litigating authority in the Postal Service, the Federal Trade Commission,
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 19 For these administrations, independent litigating authority outside the President's direct control was of little consequence. The Reagan and Bush
administrations, on the other hand, fought off congressional efforts to
create new repositories of independent litigating authority. 20 Reagan
pocket vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 because it
16 According to Susan Olson, the official position of the Justice Department "is that the
Department does not make policy-that is the responsibility and right of the client agencies."
Olson, supra note 7, at 82. For a detailed assessment of bureaucratic theory and its pitfalls, see
John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional
and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992).
17 Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987).
18 For case studies involving House Energy and Commerce Committee oversight of the
FCC, see Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1993). See also Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
19 See Olson, supra note 7; SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY
ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 95-91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62, 261-307 (1977).
20 See generally KMIEC, supra note 1. Reagan, however, did sign legislation delegating
executive branch power to the Comptroller General as part of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Budget Deficit Act and to the independent counsel as part of the Ethics in Government Act.
See LoUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14260 (1992).
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empowered a special counsel to obtain judicial review of Merit Systems Protection Board decisions, thereby undermining the President's
"authority to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordinates.''21 The Bush administration followed suit by objecting to a
proposed Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight with independent litigating authority to be established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 22
Political will also figures prominently in the President's management of existing decentralization arrangements. Grants of indepeQ.dent litigating authority to departments and agencies within the
executive may be subject to Justice Department supervision. Some of
these entities have voluntarily ceded this litigation authority to the
Attorney General; others may be directed to do so by the President.
Plainly, independent litigation authority does not bar a President
from conditioning employment within the executive to those who follow the Attorney General's lead on litigation matters. Nonstatutory
decentralization arrangements are also subject to presidential influence. No formal statutory limitation impedes the President's repeal of
either tacit understandings, such as those between the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations, 23 or
explicit arrangements formalized in "memorandums of understanding" between the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") or the Departments of Energy and Labor. 24
The likelihood of the President's exercising such political muscle
is quite another thing. The Bush and Reagan administrations, especially in challenging EPA authority to sue federal facilities, took issue
with some preexisting decentralization arrangements. 25 These arrangements were challenged as improper limitations on executive
branch policy coordination and, with it, the President's constitutional
prerogative to secure the faithful implementation of the laws. Other
administrations, most notably the Carter and Nixon administrations,
Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistle-blower Protection Act of 1988, 24
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1377 (Oct. 26, 1988).
22 See Memorandum from American Law Division, The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; May
4, 1992 (discussing Department of Justice objections to establishing an Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight).
23 See Attorney General as Chief Litigator, supra note 12, at 47 n.l.
24 See Olson, supra note 7, at 77-78.
21

WEEKLY

25 See Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, IOOth Cong., 1st
Sess. 182, 206-13 (1987) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land
and Natural Re5ources Division); id. at 678-84 (letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant
Attorney General; Office of Legislative Affairs).
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supported the use of memorandums of understanding which limited
Department of Justice control.
Finally, the political will of the executive plays a critical. role in
defining what weight will be accorded agency and departmental perspectives when litigation authority remains in the Department of Justice. Again, different administrations subscribe to different visions of
Attorney General contJ;ol. The Carter and Reagan administrations
offer a useful point of contrast. Carter's Attorney General Griffin Bell
embraced the bureaucratic vision, emphasizing that Justice Department lawyers "must take care not to interfere with the policy prerogatives of our agency clients. An agency's views should be presented to
a court unless they are inconsistent with overall governmental interests, or cannot fairly be argued." 26 Consistent with this view, Bell
directed the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") to
prepare a memorandu~ opinion advocating the insulation of the Solicitor General's office from White House influence. 27 The Reagan
administration advocated a far different view of the Attorney General's role when "faced with conflicting demands, e.g., where a 'client'
agency ... dissociate[s] itself from legal or policy judgments to which
the Executive subscribes [or] where a 'client' agency attempts to litigate against another agency or department .... " 28 In those instances,
according to an OLC opinion, signed by its office head Theodore Olson, "the Attorney General's obligation to represent and advocate the
'client' agency's position must yield to a higher obligation to [follow
the President's lead and] take care that 'the laws be executed faithfully."29 Admittedly, Olson, like Bell, refers to agencies as clients. In
contrast to Bell, Olson's disdain for this characterization is revealed in
his repeated insertion of quotation marks around "client."
Not surprisingly, Carter and Reagan administration practices varied substantially. The Carter administration openly aired disputes
before the Supreme Court, between the Department of Justice and
numerous executive departments and agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Labor. 30 Disputes between the Justice
Department and independent agencies ~ere also aired before the
26 Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief
Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1061 (1978).
2 7 Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228 (1977).
28 Attorney General as Chief Litigator, supra note 12, at 62.
29

Id.
The Department of Interior's separate views were attached in an appendix to the Brief
for the Solicitor General, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701). The
Departments of Defense and Labor, along with the Office of Personnel Management and the
EEOC, filed an amicus brief at odds with the Solicitor's amicus brief. Brief for the Departments of Defense and Labor, the Office of Personnel Management and the EEOC, Personnel
30

HeinOnline -- 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 281 1993 - 1994

282

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:273

Supreme Court-even in cases where the Attorney General (through
the Solicitor General) had plenary control over the litigation. 31 Reagan's Department of Justice was far less willing to acknowledge intragovemmental disputes. However, the Reagan Justice Department
missed the unitariness mark by quite a bit. During Reagan's first
term, Solicitor General Rex Lee sometimes resolved conflicts between
the Justice Department and independent agencies by either noting disagreements between his office and the agency in Solicitor General filings or by allowing the agency to represent itself. 32 During Reagan's
second term, Solicitor General Charles Fried, with one significant exception, refused to note intragovemmental disputes. 33 Fried, however, did not see himself as an executive branch subordinate; instead,
he viewed himself as a representative of his own interests before the
Supreme Court. 34 The repudiation of the unitary executive model by
the words and deeds of the Carter administration and-perhaps more
telling-the variable commitment to unitariness by the supposedly
ideological Reagan administration suggests that intraexecutive as well
as outside forces place political obstacles in the way of unitary legal
interpretations. 3 s
Proponents of a unitary executive cannot discount these outside
forces. For example, the White House has strong incentive to be cognizant of congressional preferences. Congress, among ot}ler things,
possesses the power of the purse and the power to confine delegated
authority to the executive through the crafting of more specific legislation. Congress also possesses significant power over Department of
Justice control of litigation. Congress, on occasion, makes use of this
power. Threats to remove the EPA from Justice Department control
prompted a "memorandum of understanding" designed to protect
EPA prerogatives. 36 More striking, Congress, prompted by the lobbying efforts of the Federal Trade Commission {"FTC"), statutorily
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (No. 78-233); Brief for the Solicitor General,

Feeny (No. 78-233).
31 See generally Devins, supra note 12. See also John A. Jenkins, The Solicitor General's
Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A. J. 734 (1983).
32 See Devins, supra note 12 (discussing such cases as Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983),
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 44 (1982), and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561 (1984)); see also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
33 See generally Devins, supra note 12. The exception is a case involving the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Fried's handling of Mistretta is discussed in FRIED, supra note 2.
34 See McGinnis, supra note 16.
3S The term "intraexecutive forces" simply refers to the divergent constituencies existing
within the executive, even among the President's political appointees. The terms "outside
forces" or "external forces" refer to interest groups, Congress, etc..
36 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CIVIL ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN THE
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responded to Solicitor General and Antitrust Division efforts to undermine FfC litigation authority. Finding that "the investigative and
law enforcement responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission
have been restricted and hampered because of inadequate legal authority,'m Congress enacted legislation protecting the Commission's
independent litigating authority in enforcement actions. 38
The prospect of congressional intervention cannot be dismissed.
It is nonetheless true, as former OLC head Douglas Kmiec argued,
that "presidential power is often best defined by the strength of presidential will. " 39 A President who believes in hierarchical government
must work at preserving the authority of his office. The FfC legislation, for example, was signed by President Nixon in exchange for congressional support of the Alaska Pipeline. 40 A President who believed
in the unitary executive would not have engaged in such a bargain.
Aside from refusing to accede to such legislative initiatives, a President can protect executive branch prerogatives in the face of intraexecutive disputes by demanding that his political appointees (including
the Attorney General) acquiesce to a unitary governmental position in
court.
The practices of modem administrations suggest that presidents
are unlikely to. consistently advance the unitary executive model.
Some administrations simply prefer the bureaucratic model to the
unitary model, and others place different values ahead of unitariness.
The Clinton administration, by its own admission, places "the need to
showcase the ethnic, racial and gender variety of [the Democratic]
party [ahead ofj any ideological litmus tests, [or] concerns about internal policy cohesion."41 Finally, even those administrations ostensibly committed to the unitary model are ultimately unwilling to
consistently demand unitariness in the face of divergent interests both
within the executive and on Capitol Hill. 42 Ronald Reagan, for example, voluntarily ceded executive power by approving Comptroller
General budget authority in Gramm-Rudman and independent counJUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (June 13, 1977),
reprinted in Env't Rep.-Fed. Laws (BNA) at 41:0101 (Oct. 30, 1992).
37 Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(a)(l), 87 Stat. 591 (1973).
38

Id.

KMIEC, supra note 1, at 47.
See Devins, supra note 12.
41 David S. Broder, Diversity was Paramount in Building the Cabinet, WASH. PosT, Dec.
25, 1992, at Al.
42 This explains disunitariness in the Reagan administration's policy on civil rights. See
Devins, supra note 8, at 1749-63; HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 181-209 (1991).
See generally Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15.
39

40
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sel prosecutions under the Ethics in Government Act. 43
Indisputably, political will plays an extraordinary role, moderating the vigor of the executive's pursuit of hierarchical control of government litigation. The Reagan and Bush administrations, for
example, advanced unitariness concerns with far greater regularity
than either the Nixon or Carter administration. Political will also
plays a large role in fostering resistance to this unitary model by
either Congress or affected governmental agencies. The question remains whether structural constraints on presidential power diminish
the role of political will in defining the unitariness of the government
in court. Departments and agencies technically under the President's
control cannot escape ali energetic Executive. Are independent agencies without independent litigating authority equally subject to such
presidential control? Finally, what about cases where the agency possesses independent litigating authority and its head cannot be fired by
the President? Do these structural constraints determine whether an
independent agency will speak its own voice in court or does political
will still play a paramount role? The remainder of this Article will
speak to these questions.

II.

UNITARINESS AND INDEPENDENCE

The structural paradigm of agency independence anticipates that
an independent agency will assert its own views when confronted with
a conflicting executive branch interpretation. Otherwise, it would be
senseless to prevent the President from dismissing independent
agency heads at will. The structural paradigm likewise assumes that
independent litigating authority and other constraints on the President's power are necessary to provide independent agencies with a
podium from which they can speak their own voice. If the agencies
were not granted i'ndependent litigating authority, for example, the
Department of Justice would not sublimate its views thereby enabling
the independent agency to act as the government's mouthpiece.
The structural trappings of independence define much of the dialogue between the executive branch and independent agencies. The
political willfulness of various governmental actors also plays a large
role. The EEOC· abandoned independence in the face of a willful executive and disinterested Congress. In sharp contrast, the Department of Justice abdicated control to the FCC to accommodate the
President's recently named appointees and perhaps the President himself. Finally, the Postal Service withstood executive assertions of
43

See supra note 20.
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power because poor strategic planning severely weakened the White
House's power base.
·
A.

The EEOC, the Department of Justice, and the Congress
1.

The EEOC v. the Department of Justice

.

EEOC litigation in federal district courts is ·structurally protected from Executive control and its .decision making is insulated
from direct presidential supervision. The EEOC is a multimember
agency headed by five commissioners.44 Each commissioner serves a
five-year term45 and presumably can only be removed for cause. 46
Barring resignations, no President can appoint a majority of the Commission until the third year of his first term. Partisan controls are
further limited by the requirement that no more than three commissioners be of the same political party. This independence figures
prominently in litigation decisions, for the EEOC lias independent litigating authority before lower federal courts to initiate specified categories of employment discrimination lawsuits. 47 EEOC litigation
authority is further insulated from executive control because the
EEOC general counsel, while a presidential appointee, serves a fixed
·
four-year term.
The structural independence of the EEOC is far from complete.
The EEOC is technically located within the executive brancl}. More
significant, unlike independent regulatory agencies which possess
quasi-adjudicatory and quasi-legislative authority, EEOC authority is
exclusively executive. For the most part, the EEOC interprets various
employment discrimination statutes and applies its in~erpretation
through litigation. 48 Th.e nexus between the EEOC and the executive
branch is further heightened by an intermingling of fun_ctions that
takes place both at the Department of Justice. and at the Commission;
The EEOC, through a Carter . administration reorganization,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988).
/d.
46 The EEOC statute, like those for the FCC and other independent agencies, is silent on
the grounds for removal. It would be senseless, however, for heads of multimember. agencies,
who serve staggered terms, and who may not belong to the President's political party, to serve
at the pleasure of the President. Otherwise, the elaborate statutory. structure designed to limit
presidential authority would be a farce.
·
47 The statute provides that "the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge ....
[T]he Attorney General ... may bring a civil action ·against [a government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision] in the appropriate United States district court." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-S(t) (1988).
48 See U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 10-11 (1987). .
'
44
45

HeinOnline -- 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 285 1993 - 1994

286

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:273

took charge of several employment discrimination areas that were
previously the responsibility of executive departments and agencies.
Under this reorganization, the EEOC assumed Department of Labor
and Civil Service Commission authority over the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, and various federal sector
equal employment opportunity requirements. 49 The EEOC was also
dubbed the "lead agency" in employment discrimination matters and
authorized to coordinate the enforcement strategies of eighteen governmental agencies with Title VII enforcement power. 50 This authority, among other things, included the power to demand that all
governmental agencies file affirmative action plans, with goals and
timetables, to the EEOC. 51 Through its designated role as lead coordinator as well as its assumption of power from purely executive entities, EEOC operations commingle with executive branch authority.
Direct EEOC involvement with the executive is also a by-product of Department of Justice authority to separately enforce and interpret employment discrimination laws. Suits against state and local
government are the exclusive province of the Civil Rights Division. 52
The Civil Division, which represents the government when it is sued
in employment discrimination matters, also has the power to independently interpret employment discrimination laws. Finally, .at the
Supreme Court level, all employment discrimination litigation is handled by the Solicitor General. 53 With three separate offices in the Justice Department litigating employment discrimination cases, the
Department has a very strong interest in controlling the government's
position in discrimination litigation. Needless to say, the potential for
serious conflict between the Justice Department and the Commission
is also great. Clearly, this concurrence of authority is combustible.
The explosion eventually occurred during the Reagan administration.
The triggering event was an amicus brief supporting race-con49 Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4
(1988 & Supp. III 1992) (printed following the statute on pp. 410-11). See also James W.
Singer, Equal Employment Agencies are Beginning to Shape Up, 10 NAT'L. J. 19 (1978).
so While recognizing EEOC "leadership and coordination" responsibilities, Executive Order 12,067 specifies that disputes between EEOC and other federal entities may be referred to
the Executive Office of the President. Exec. Order No. 12,067 (1-201), (1-307(c)), 43 Fed. Reg.
28,967 (1987). Additionally, Executive Order 12,250, entitled "Leadership and Coordination
of Nondiscrimination Laws," grants the Department of Justice the explicit power to coordinate enforcement of statutory nondiscrimination in federal funding provisions. Exec. Order
No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980).
51 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 41.
52 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(0 (1988).
53 Solicitor General authority over Supreme Court litigation can only be limited by an
explicit statutory exception. EEOC independent litigation authority clearly does not extend to
the Supreme Court. See supra note 47.

HeinOnline -- 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 286 1993 - 1994

1993] POLITICAL WILL AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 287
scious affirmative action that the EEOC intended to file before a federal appeals court in Williams v. City of New Orleans. 54 The EEOC
draft brief flatly contradicted a Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division· amicus brief that had already been filed in the case. 55 Indeed, the EEOC characterized the Justice Department's failure to
consult the EEOC before filing its amicus brief as "deplorable."56
Rather than permitting the expression of conflicting views, which as
the EEOC put it, would be of "considerable public benefit," 57 the Justice Department saw the EEOC brief as an outrageous challenge to
the Civil Rights Division's exclusive authority to manage employment
discrimination lawsuits involving state and local government. In the
Civil Rights Division's view, the government must speak with a unified voice in state and local cases and that voice is the Civil Rights
Division. To prove its point, the Civil Rights Division claimed that it
would block the EEOC from filing its amicus brief. 58
The Civil Rights Division claim is at odds with structural constraints that protect EEOC autonomy. Although the Civil Rights Division has exclusive authority to initiate state and local cases, there
are no statutory limits on the EEOC's independent authority to participate in lower court employment discrimination cases. Structural
limits on executive control, instead, suggest that the EEOC would defend its stake in independent interpretations of employment discrimination laws through participation in state and local cases. For the
EEOC, Williams was not simply a state and local case. If accepted,
the Justice Department's position in Williams would undermine the
EEOC's private sector litigation strategy, including several EEOC-initiated private sector consent decrees. 59 The EEOC understood the
54

729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984).

ss The Justice Department brief argued that the affirmative action plan infringed on the
rights of "innocent nonblack employees." Brieffor the Justice Department Before Fifth Circuit
Asking En Bane Rehearing in Williams v. City of New Orleans, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.6,
at E-1 (Jan. 10, 1983). The EEOC brief castigated the Department of Justice:
Contrary to this uniform body of case law approving the use of prospective employment goals, however, the Department of Justice asks this Court to hold that
judicial relief under Title VII must be limited to restoring actual victims of discrimination .... No court has accepted the Justice Department's construction of
[this portion of Title VII] . . . .
·
Draft EEOC Brief in Williams v. City of New Orleans, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at E-1
(Apr. 6, 1983), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT file.
S6 EEOC Chides Justice for "Deplorable" Action on New Orleans Police Case, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-2 (Feb. 1, 1983).
57 Fred Barbash & Juan Williams, Administration Prods EEOC on Quotas Brief, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 1983, at Al.
58 See EEOC Bows to White House Pressure, Says It Won't File New Orleans Brief [hereinafter White House Pressure], Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at A-6 (Apr. 6, 1983).
s9 According to EEOC Chair Clarence Thomas, "judicial ratification of the Justice Depart-
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impact of Williams on its litigation strategy; the Commission also recognized that the Justice Department's disregard of the EEOC's role
"as the chief interpreter of Title VII" represented "a major ... change
in government's civil rights policy."60
The EEOC's strong interest in Williams, strengthened by structural constraints on executive authority, suggests that the EEOC
would have stood firm in the face of this Civil Rights Division challenge, and filed its amicus·brief. In the end, however, the EEOC capitulated to the Jus~ice Department challenge.· The turning event was
a White House meeting between EEOC chair Clarence Thomas and
general counsel David Slate, with presidential counsel Ed Meese, Attorney General William French Smith, and Civil Rights Division
head William Bradford Reynold~. 61
The factors leading to the EEOC's ·withdrawal in Williams are
complex; clearly the structural paradigm of agency independence
sheds little light upon the situation. The Commission's stated reason
was that the "public interest" was not served by the presentation of
"conflicting [govei'Jllllental] views on a legal issue involving a city
government where the Justice Department has sole enforcement litigation respo~sibility. " 62 This explanation, of course, flatly contradicts the EEOC's earlier assertion that the presentation of its
conflicting views would be of ~·considerable publjc benefit." A more
likely explanation is 'that the White House meeting convinced the
EEOC heads that it would be politically unwise to do battle with the
Justi~ Department. During 'the Williams controversy, OLC issued
an opinion in support of the Civil Rights Division. This opinion went
beyond the state and local authority issue to assert that the Carter
administration reorganization, by transferring authority from the Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commission to the EEOC, de
facto made the EEOC an executiv.e agency "subject to the supervision
and control of the President." 63 That the EEOC had earlier participated in public sector cases was irrelevant. OLC viewed such appearances as having "been'made with the approval of the attorney general,
ment's position would undermine the Commission's guidelines, settlements, consent decrees
and court orders." U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 41 n.310.
60 White House Pressure, supra note !18 (quoting letter fr9m the EEOC to Attorney General Smith). See also Federal Agencies Differ Sharply Over New Orleans Affirmative Action
Plan, 21 Gov't Empl. Rei. Rep. '(BNA) No. 1004, at 581 (Mar. 14, 1983).
61 See Barbash & Williams, supra note 57.
62 White House Pressure, supra note 58.
63 The OLC opinion is described in Report by House Committee on Government Operations
on EEOC Handling of Sex-Based Wage ·Discrimination, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 102, at D-1 (May 2!1, 1984).
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whether implicit or explicit."64
The OLC opinion suggested that the Justice Department was
prepared to use Williams as a vehicle to neutnllize EEOC independence in both public and private sector litigation. EEOC chairman
Thomas took the bait, demurely commenting· that "(t]his case has
clarified our standing.... It points out to Congress the chink in our
armor ... [that] we are in the executive branch which has its own
opinions.'' 6 s This concession is truly extraordinary. EEOC private
sector litigation authority was not before the court in Williams. Consequently, rather than risk an adverse court ruling on 'public sector
authority, the EEOC effectively admitted defeat by not creating the
opportunity for a favorable court ruling. Ironically, the appellate
court in Williams made reference to the EEOCs draft brief, a leaked
copy of which had been submitted to the court through an amicus
brief. 66
The EEOC did little more than put up a feeble fight in Williams.
It is difficult to know whether the Justice Department frightened the
Commission with its legal arguments or convinced EEOC appointees
that their political futures hinged on acquiescence to its position.
What is clear is that the EEOC did not seek strength in supposedly
empowering structural constraints on executive authority. Instead,
the interplay of various political players; their expectations, and their
willingness to assert power provides insight into the outcome in
Williams.
The EEOC not only lost the battle over Jfilliams; it l_ost a much
larger battle with the Justice Department as a .consequence of Williams. The Justice Department, in the wake of Williams, relegated
the EEOC to the executive branch. Rather than serving as lead
agency, the Justice Department views the EEOC ~ its "whipping
boy." For example, the Department has. flatly refused to submit an
affirmative action plan to. the EEOC, prompting the ·EEOC to maintain that it cannot enforce the requirement. 67 More striking, the Solicitor General refuses to recognize the EEOC as an independent
agency. While the EEOC may seek to persuade the Solicitor General
of the correctness of its posit~on on a given issue (and indeed may
influence Solicitor General decision making), the Solicitor General to64 Ruth Simon, Future Role of EEOC Questioned; A Shift ofAuthority, NAT'L. L.J., May 2,
1983, at 7.
· ·
6S Juan Williams, Lawmaker Urges EEOC Not to Quit Rights Case, WASH. PoST, Apr. 10,
·
·
1983, at All.
66 See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1571-73 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom,
J., et al., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67 See U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48; at 41 n.315.
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day seems disinclined to allow the EEOC to advance competing arguments before the Supreme Court.
This practice can be linked to the Williams controversy.
Throughout the Carter administration, the EEOC was allowed to file
briefs in direct opposition to Solicitor General positions. 68 During
Reagan's first term, Solicitor General Rex Lee noted disagreements
between his office and the EEOC. 69· Following the Williams dispute,
however, the Solicitor General freely disregarded competing EEOC
perspectives-even in cases where the EEOC was a party. This is
precisely what occurred in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC. 10
Sheet Metal Workers marked the culmination of the EEOC's
transformation into the executive branch (for at least the Department
of justice). Although the EEOC, a party in the case, had S"Qccessfully
defended federal court authority to order affirmative action hiring in
an employment discrimination lawsuit, 71 the Solicitor General unilaterally reversed the Commission's position in a brief it filed with the
Supreme Court on behalf of the Commission. 72 That the EEOC was a
party mattered little to the Solicitor General. In his autobiography,
Order and Law, Charles Fried did not even mention the EEOC in his
extensive accounting of the caseY Moreover, when the EEOC explained its position to Solicitor General attorneys, it was told that it
was a part of the executive and would have to accept Department of
68 See supra note 30 (discussing separate filing by EEOC in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeny).
69 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24 n.23,
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (No. 82-206) ("The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission disagrees with this interpretation of Section 706(g) and
believes that its adoption might call into question numerous extant consent decrees and conciliation agreements to which the EEOC is a party."); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 1-2 n.l, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (No. 80-2147) (noting dispute
between Solicitor General and EEOC). Justice Brennan, who rejected the Department of Justice's position, referred to the EEOC's refusal to sign onto the Department of Justice brief in
his opinion. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
70 478 u.s. 421 (1986).
71 EEOC v. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.
1985), aff'd, Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
72 See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656). Remarkably, thenActing EEOC General Counsel Johnny Butler signed this brief. However, Butler claimed in
an interview that he and the EEOC vigorously opposed the Solicitor General's position. It is
difficult to determine whether Butler sought to win favor with the Reagan. administration
through his signature or whether he honestly felt obligated to sign the brief. Whatever the
explanation, Butler and the EEOC did not alter their views on the permissibility of affirmative
action. Telephone -Interview with Johnny Butler, former Acting General Counsel of the
EEOC (Sept. 16, 1992).
73 See FRIED, supra note 2, at 110-14.
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Justice opposition to affirmative action. 74 The only concession the Solicitor General made to the EEOC was that it opposed the grant of
certiorari so that the Court could resolve the Sheet Metal Workers
issue in an analogous case already before the Court. 75 It is unclear
whether this concession was rooted in a desire to accord some respect
to EEOC positions or whether the Solicitor General feared the repercussions of disregarding EEOC views altogether. Once certiorari was
granted, however, EEOC prerogatives played no apparent role in the
Solicitor General's handling of the case.
Sheet Metal Workers is an extreme example of the Solicitor General's discounting of EEOC autonomy but it is not an anomaly. In
Riverside v. Rivera/6 the Solicitor General rejected EEOC efforts to
participate as an amicus supporting plaintiffs' claims in an attorney
fee case. 77 Instead, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in opposition to plaintiffs' claims without mention of the EEOC's conflicting position. 78 Ironically, EEOC arguments were presented to the
Court-the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund reproduced
a leaked draft of the rejected EEOC brief in its amicus filing. 79 Another recent example of Solicitor General unwillingness to recognize
EEOC differences is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 80 In Price
Waterhouse, the Solicitor General did not note EEOC disagreement
with its view that evidence of sexual stereotyping could be rebutted by
a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing
evidence. 81
Solicitor General Fried's willingness to heed OLC's opinion on
the EEOC's executive branch status is not surprising. The Solicitor
General need not defer to voices within the executive that contradict
his own conception of executive branch desires. 82 The EEOC's subor7 4 Telephone Interview with Johnny Butler, fanner Acting General Counsel of the EEOC
(Sept. 16, 1992).
7 5 See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9, Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656).
76 477 u.s. 561 (1986).
77 See Justice Department Rejects EEOC Advice, Seeks Limit on Lawyer Fees in Rights
Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at A-1 (Jan. 9, 1986).
78 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (No. 85-224).
79 Appendix to Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. in Support of Respondents, City of Riverside v. Santos, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (No. 85-224).
80 490 u.s. 228 (1989).
8t See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-24 n.lO, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167). Respondent's attorney noted this omission in
their brief: "The Solicitor General's failure to comment on EEOC's position ... is curious."
Brief for Respondent at 42 n.32, Price Waterhouse (No. 87-1167).
82 See generally Devins, supra note 12; McGinnis, supra note 16.
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dination to the executive branch therefore enhances Solicitor General
authority. On an issue as polarizing as affirmative action, where one
would expect ideological consistency within the executive, the authority to advance a unitary governmental position is especially important. That affirmative action was the agenda item for the Civil Rights
Division also lent support to intradepartmental Solicitor General control. Moreover, without any statutory claim in support of independent litigating authority before the Supreme Court, the EEOC had
little leverage to combat this Solicitor General interpretation. In
other words, the Solicitor General had the power and was willing to
use it. Furthermore, .the EEOC's acceptance of Justice Department
authority in Williams was the functional equivalent of a "kick me"
sign to potentially conflicting Justice Department interests.
The battle between the Justice Department and the EEOC was
inevitable. The Department of Justice perceived the EEOC as a
threat to its own power, to the Department's civil rights agenda, and
to the ability of the government to speak with a unified voice. With
the Department of Justice prepared to reign over the EEOC and curtail its power, the EEOC was wide open to attack. Thus, the control
of government employment discrimination litigation demonstrates the
Justice Department's willingness to launch ·a political broadside
against the EEOC and the Commission's concomitant failure to fend
off these political advances. Congress's acquiescence to this Justice
Department pQwer-play was also of prime importance. Indeed, Congress's inability or unwillingness to create a truly executive or independent EEOC set the stage for the Williams controversy.
2.

Congressional Indeterminacy and the EEOC

Congressional expectations regarding the EEOC's power were
shaped by the tortuous evolution of the agency, from its creation in
1964 to its ultimate reorganization in 1978. By the time the big showdown between Justice and the EEOC finally came about, Congress
understood the EEOC to be principally a weak agency. Moreover,
Congress considered the EEOC to be slightly more executive than independent in nature. Thus, although Congress urged the EEOC to
resist Department of Justice control, Congress was unwilling to intervene and actively prevent EEOC subjugation to Justice Department
authority.
The EEOC had less than auspicious beginnings. In the complex
battle over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC was the victim of
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partisan compromise. 83 The Kennedy administration bill rejected the
establishment of any federal enforcement agency in favor of increased
funding and statutory recognition of the Vice President's Equal Employment Opportunity Committee. 84 Instead, congressional liberals
favored the creation of a full-blown independent regulatory agency
with both quasi-judicial and cease-and-desist authority. 8 s Moderates
and conservatives alike cringed at the prospect of employer "harassment" by "a new mission agency like the EEOC." 86 The solution was
a peculiar structural compromise which left the EEOC a "poor enfeebled thing. " 87
While structured like an independent agency with multiple commissioners serving staggered terms, the EEOC had no real power. Its
role was limited to complaint processing associated with private enforcement. The 1964 Civil Rights Act also authorized the Justice Department to file "pattern and practice" cases. The placement of
litigation authority with the Attorney General rather than the EEOC
was less a matter of the executive having control over the issue and
more a matter of the substantive implications of Justice Department
control. Congressional moderates believed that the Justice Department would only file a small number of high profile cases rather than
engage in massive litigation. 88
The history of the EEOC's establishment demonstrates Congress's low expectations for its authority; without protest, the hopes
for a powerful Title VII enforcement agency died. Further complications stemmed from the peculiar blend of Department of Justice litigation authority with an EEOC structured as an independent agency
but possessing (at least in 1964) none of its powers. The EEOC, as
Wendy Watson put it, "was a duck which could neither waddle nor
quack, but it was a duck nonetheless. " 89
The EEOC's structure and authority was again at issue before
Congress in 1972. Not surprisingly, the 1964 model accomplished little, and Congress was set to weigh in to ensure more vigorous enforce83 Memorandum from American Law Division, The Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, to Senate Committee on Government Operations, regarding Status of Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter Status of EEOC], Sept. 19, 1977, at 7 (citing legislative history of Title VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
84 See generally HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 125-52 (1990).
85 See id. at 83-87.
86 /d. at 146.
87 Remarks by Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor, Rutgers Law School on Binding Effect of
EEOC Affirmative Action Guidelines, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at D-1 (May 8, 1984).
88 See GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 146.
89 Wendy L. Watson, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: A Less-Loved
Stepchild 21 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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ment of employment discrimination legislation. Congress was to
decide whether it should accomplish this objective by granting the
EEOC quasi-adjudicatory "cease-and-desist" authority (administrative enforcement) or by expanding its governmental litigation authority (judicial enforcement). Congress chose the judicial enforcement
model as a result of the mismatched lobbying of civil rights interests
and the Nixon White House. Civil rights interests, emphasizing the
dangers of a regulatory agency becoming "captive" to the regulated
industry, argued that a weaker institutional framework (that is, one in
which the agency did not have cease-and-desist authority) enabled
civil rights activists to use federal courts "which are favorable to their
demands. " 90 The Nixon administration favored judicial enforcement
for exactly opposite reasons, namely, "the Republicans' vintage judicial strategy of maximizing the role of adversary proceedings in court
so as to minimize the judgmental discretion of New Dealish regulatory agencies. " 91
The 1972 amendments gave the EEOC litigation authority in the
private sector and entrusted state and local cases to the Justice Department. The choice of a judicial enforcement model over a traditional regulatory structure is revealing. It suggests a purposeful
devaluing of the administrative state and, with it, congressional oversight in shaping the development of employment discrimination protections. With reference to Congress's understanding of the EEOC's
status, however, the 1972 amendments contain very little. Although
cease-and-desist authority was again rejected, the strange hodgepodge
of supporters and rationales did little to define congressional understanding of the EEOC's independent status.
Congress's uncertainty over the EEOC's status is revealed in a
1977 request by one of the EEOC's oversight committees, the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, to the Congressional Research Service for clarification of whether the EEOC is an independent agency. 92 The Congressional Research Service's response is
equally telling. Noting that although
[t]he precise question of the EEOC's status does not appear to have
been directly raised during consideration by the Congress of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... [t]he evolution of that title,
together with some indirect comments on the matter militate
against the conclusion that the EEOC is an independent regulatory
supra note 84, at 431.
/d. at 426-27.
Status of EEOC, supra note 83, at 1.

90 GRAHAM,

91
92
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commission. 93
In 1978, Congress again faced this issue when the Carter administration submitted its reorganization plan to Congress for approval or
legislative veto. The reorganization, envisioning a superagency in
charge of civil rights, gave the EEOC lead authority to coordinate
equal employment opportunity agencies and thereby "strengthen enforcement by coordinating the government's activities and eliminating
duplication and waste of effort among the federal enforcement
agencies. " 94
The reorganization was the brainchild of then EEOC chair Eleanor Holmes Norton. Frustrated by the EEOC's lack of power, Norton believed that the Commission should formally integrate its
operations with executive departments and agencies. Even though
Civil Rights Division head Drew Days, and others within the Carter
administration, thought that the reorganization might eventually
haunt its sponsors by symbolically lifting the EEOC's quasi-independent veneer, 95 Norton persisted because she already considered the
EEOC "an agency in the executive branch and not a traditional in·
dependent agency." 96
Whether Congress agreed with Norton is unclear. Without comment, the House and Senate oversight committees allowed the reorganization to take effect. 97 Congress, apparently, did not see any need
to structurally protect the EEOC's independence.
The Williams controversy occurred in the aftershocks of Congress's 1978 inaction. Relying on Congress's acquiescence to the 1978
reorganization, the Justice Department claimed that only an executive
EEOC could coordinate executive policymaking and receive Department of Labor and Civil Service Commission authority by way of an
administrative transfer of power. Williams thus presented Congress
with another opportunity to define both EEOC policymaking and its
position within government.
Although it expressed dissatisfaction with the Commission's
withdrawal from Williams, Congress declined to seize this opportu93 /d. at 7 (citing Legislative History of Title VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
9 4 Eleanor H. Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpretation-Survival Against
the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681, 706 n.98 (1988).
.
95 Telephone Interview with Drew Days, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights during the Carter administration (Sept. 24, 1992). Days has since become the Clinton administration Solicitor General.
96 Norton, supra note 94, at 706.
97 The reorganization was approved under a one-house legislative veto. After the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the legislative veto, Congress enacted legislation approving en masse
prior reorganizations.
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nity. Instead, Congress cajoled and condemned the Commission for
its refusal to challenge the Justice Department. House Judiciary chair
Peter Rodino (D-N.J.) asked the Commission to supply Congress
with all relevant correspondence with the Reagan administration. 98
Moreover, EEOC chair Clarence Thomas was asked to testify about
the Williams controversy before the House Judiciary and Labor Committees.99 Finally, the House Committee on Government Operations
issued a report chastising the EEOC for failing to live up to its "obligation to participate in court cases, particularly controversial or precedent setting cases . . . ." 100 At the least, the report continues, the
EEOC should "bring the issue of its independence before a court for
resolution." 101 In a remarkable bit of doublespeak, the report simultaneously speaks of the "EEOC retain[ing] its independent authority
to enforce Title VII[,]" 102 "[d]espite its status as an executive agency,
subject to the authority of the President." 103
Congress, instead of criticizing the EEOC, should have looked at
its own blemishes. Rather than protect the EEOC through legislation
bolstering Commission autonomy or limiting Department of Justice
intervention, Congress did little more than ask the EEOC to fend for
itself. In short, Congress offered no genuine assistance. By asking the
EEOC to simultaneously recognize presidential authority and independently enforce Title VII, Congress asked for the impossible. Clarence Thomas certainly recognized this dilemma, stating that the
EEOC was "created to take the lead responsibility in setting civil
rights policy in court but [it is] in the executive branch which has its
own opinions. So there is a contradiction." 104 From its establishment
of the EEOC in 1964 to its approval of the 1978 reorganization, Congress had consistently left the EEOC in never-never land status of
part-executive part-independent agency. That the EEOC landed in
the executive branch should have come as no surprise to a Congress
that had never seen the EEOC as a strong independent voice.
98 See Juan Williams, Lawmakers Urge EEOC not to Quit Rights Case, WASH. PoST, Apr.
10, 1983, at All.
99 Statements by EEOC Chairman Thomas, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds Before
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.

90, at F-1 (May 9, 1983).
100 HOUSE CoMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PAY EQUITY: EEOC's HANDLING Of SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS, H.R. REP. No. 796, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. S (1984).
101
102
103

/d.
/d. at 10.
Id.

104 Williams,

supra note 98.
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3. Summary
The structural trappings of independence did not prevent the
EEOC from conceding its independent litigating authority in Williams. These structural constraints, moreover, did not prevent the
Justice Department from launching a frontal assault against the
EEOC. Finally, Congress did not see Justice Department actions as
an affront to congressional efforts to structurally protect the EEOC
from executive branch intrusions; Congress's opprobrium was little
more than rhetorical badgering, directed only at the EEOC.
The interaction between the ·EEOC, the Justice Department, and
the Congress suggests that agency independence is elusive. The structural paradigm must recognize the extraordinary role that political
will plays in defining agency. independence. With respect to the
EEOC, the Justice Department was highly motivated to achieve
unitariness on affirmative action. The EEOC, in contrast, did not
want to engage in a pitched battle with the Justice Department. Indeed, in the aftermath of Williams, EEOC chair Thomas asserted that
"EEOC's next four years will be marked by concerted efforts to set
forth the Reagan Administrative's position on affirmative action." 105
Whether Thomas was driven by ideological consistency, political ambition, or the belief that the EEOC was subject to executive supervision, the EEOC's capitulation in Williams was complete.
Supporters of a strong EEOC should not fault Chairman Thomas
too much. The EEOC could not simultaneously maintain a strong
independent voice and be an executive agency subordinate to the
President. 106 While the Justice Department sought to push the EEOC
into the executive, Congress placed no competing pressure on the
Commission. Indeed, Congress's disinterest in the EEOC's status is
significant. Congress paid little attention to the location of the EEOC
in both 1964 and 1972 when it bargained away cease-and-desist au!OS Statements Before House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities on EEOC's
Policies on Civil Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 242, at D·l (Dec. 17, 1984) (statement of

Barry Goldstein, assistant counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund). Chairman
Thomas's willingness to acquiesce to executive will appeared as a permanent mark on his
record to civil rights groups. For example, in explaining his organization's opposition to
Thomas's Supreme Court nomination, Ralph Neas of the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights stated that "shortly after (Thomas] took that position of independence (in Williams], I
think Edward Meese and William Bradford Reynolds met with him, and basically explained
·what the Reagan administration position was going to be on civil rights issues. So again, I
think the record has to speak for itself." News Conference of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, Fed. News Serv. (Aug. 7, 1991).
106 Eleanor Holmes Norton's suggestion that the EEOC could have it both ways is clearly
incorrect. See Norton, supra note 94. Officers who serve at the President's pleasure are ultimately subordinate to the White House.
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thority for other objectives. Congress's acquiescence to a 1978 reorganization which immersed the EEOC into the executive branch
likewise suggests an absence of commitment to a structurally independent EEOC.
These political maneuverings explain the EEOC's curious structure. Without cease-and-desist authority and with the Justice Department's concurrent authority to litigate employment discrimination
actions, the EEOC was far from a prototypical independent regulatory agency. 107 The question of whether the numerous structural constraints which limited executive authority over the EEOC indeed
placed the EEOC outside the executive, was ultimately a test of political will. The executive asserted its domain and neither Congress nor
the EEOC challenged this claim of authority.

B.

The FCC and the Postal Service: Department of Justice
Initiatives and Congressional Expectations

The role of political will in defining agency independence is certainly not limited to the EEOC. The recent experiences of the rCC
and the Postal Service likewise make clear that structure is but one
ingredient in determining whether the government will speak as a unitary voice in court. In the case of the FCC, the Department of Justice
chose to cede some of its litigating authority rather than battle the
Congress and the Commission. The Postal Service case, like Williams, involved White House and Department of Justice efforts to
overcome a statutory grant of independent litigation authority. Contrary to Williams, the Postal Service, thanks to greater structural protections and a weakened presidency, successfully fended off this
executive initiative.

1.

The FCC

The FCC is a statutorily designated independent regulatory
agency. 108 Similar to the EEOC, it has five members who serve staggered five-year terms, thereby limiting the President's appointment
power to one commissioner per year. Like the EEOC, the appointment power is further constrained by the requirement that no more
than three Commissioners may be members of the same political
party. Finally, as with the EEOC, the President presumably (for the
statute is silent) may only remove Commissioners for cause. 109 In
contrast to the EEOC, the FCC possesses quasi-adjudicatory and
107 See Status of EEOC, supra note 83.
1os 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (Supp. III 1992).
109 See supra note 46.
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quasi-legislative powers, including cease-and-desist authority. FCC
functions, moreover, are not formally intermingled with executive
branch operations.
FCC relationships with the Department of Justice are difficult to
characterize. This difficulty is a byproduct of an extraordinarily confusing statutory scheme which sometimes allows the FCC to appeal
its cases directly to the Supreme Court, sometimes makes the FCC
entirely dependent on Department of Justice attorneys throughout the
course of litigation, and at times authorizes FCC representation
before federal courts of appeals and Solicitor General representation
before the Supreme Court. Department of Justice attorneys represent
the FCC throughout the course of litigation in actions brought against
the Commission to enforce its orders, as well as in employment discrimination and Freedom of Information Act suits filed against the
Commission. 110 In sharp contrast to this category of cases are those
where the FCC has a statutory right to seek a writ of certiorari before
the Supreme Court in appeals of FCC declaratory orders. 111 Finally,
licensing decisions, handled by the FCC before federal appeals courts
and by the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court, involve a
murkier division of responsibility between the Commission and the
Justice Department. 112
Policy disputes between the FCC and. Justice. Department occur
frequently. FCC licensing and regulation~ ·often ~conflict with Justice
Department interpretations of antitrus~ laws, .as well as with the Constitution's free speech and equality guarantees. The prospect of these
disputes being aired in court depends both on the type of case and the
willingness of the Justice Department to exclude the FCC from cases
within its control.
The structural paradigm, in many instances, holds true to form
with the Justice Department declining to present FCC arguments
with which it disagrees. One such dispute involved the League of Women Voters' challenge to a statutory prohibition of editorializing by
public television and radio stations, a case controlled by the Justice
Department from its inception. The FCC thought the editorial ban
was unconstitutional; the Reagan Justice Department did not, however, and unilaterally pursued this case from beginning to end. 113
When the Supreme Court rejected this Department of Justice defense
and struck down the amended statute, the FCC rejoiced-calling the
110
Ill

112
113

47 u.s.c. §§ 401, 504 (1988); 28 u.s.c. §§ 516, 519 (1988).
47 u.s.c. § 402(j) (1988); 28 u.s.c. § 2350 (1988).
47 u.s.c. § 402(b) (1988).
See Devins, supra note 12.
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decision "a significant breakthrough." 114 Another case where the Justice Department exercised its authority involved FCC must-carry
rules, requiring cable companies to carry local television signals. The
Department perceived these rules as unconstitutional and refused, as
the FCC had requested, to petition the Supreme Court to review the
appellate court decision striking down these rules. 113
FCC decisions to openly dispute Department of Justice positions
with which it disagrees and .defend its declaratory orders as a matter
of statutory right also match the structural paradigm. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation 116 and FCC v. MCI Telecommunications 117 typify such
cases. In both instances, the FCC .and Solicitor General presented
their divergent views as statutory respondents before the Supreme
Court. In Pacifica, the FCC successfully argued that certain words
could be kept off the airwaves for most broadcasting hours and
thereby withstood the Solicitor General's challenge to the Fcc·order
as overbroad because the Commission did not consider "the context
in which the offending words were used." 118 MCI concerned an FCC
order establishing that AT&T had no obligation to interconnect its
facilities with those of MCI. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated this order. The FCC then petitioned for certiorari and the
Solicitor General filed a petition in opposition. 119 Certiorari was denied, 120 yet the case is noteworthy because of a biting footnote in the
FCC brief "question[ing] exactly what interests of the United States
the Solicitor legitimately represents in this case." 121 This statement of
outrage is indicative of the power of independent litigating authority.
On several occasions, however, the structural paradigm has given
way to the give and take of politics as well as competing visions of the
114 Fred Barbash, High Court Rules for Public TV; Right to Comment Upheld Despite Federal Funding, WASH. PosT, July 3, 1984, at A1 (quoting FCC general counsel Bruce Fein).
113 See Government Won't Appeal Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 28, 1988, at 37.
116 438 u.s. 726 (1978).
117 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforced in 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 u.s. 980 (1978).
118 Brief for the United States at 14, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77528). But see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Pacifica Found. (No. 77-528) ("The [FCC] order
seeks to protect parental and privacy interests ... to the extent that this Court's constitutional
opinions permit.") (footnote omitted).
119 See Brief for the United States in Opposition, United States lndep. Tel. Ass'n v. United
States and MCI Telecommunications Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-216); Petitioner's
Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition," FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-270).
12o FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforced in 580
F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
121 Petitioner's Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition" at 1 n.1, FCC v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-270).

HeinOnline -- 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 300 1993 - 1994

1993] POLITICAL WILL AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 301
unitary executive. This is especially evident in licensing decisions,
cases where the FCC controls litigation in the lower courts and the
Solicitor General controls Supreme Court adjudication. This division
of litigation responsibility enables the Solicitor General to reverse
FCC positions before the Supreme Court. In the EEOC context,
where a similar division of responsibility exists; the Solicitor General
now views such conflicts as intraexecutive matters appropriately resolved by his office. The Solicitor General did precisely that in Sheet
Metal Workers. 122 The FCC, indisputably an independent agency,
presents a more complicated scenario. Moreover, the FCC is statutorily authorized to present its views before the Supreme Court in declaratory order cases.
Bureaucratic theory would resolve this conflict by having the Solicitor General view the FCC as a client in need of representation.
The Carter administration adopted tliis model to resolve a dispute
between the Justice Department and the FCC over Commission rules
governing the cross ownership of television stations and newspapers
in a single market. Specifically, the 'FCC represented its own interests
before the Court while the Solicitor General filed a separate brief "on
behalf of the United States." 123 Proponents of the unitary executive,
in contrast, would view the Solicitor General's loyalties and obligations as running exclusively to the White House. Under this view, the
independent agency's authority should be set aside in favor of executive branch interests, exercised through the Solicitor General. This is
exactly what occurred in Sheet Metal Workers and iil several other
cases involving independent agencies.
The extent to which the Solicitor General will oppose FCC and
other independent agency decisions is a question of political will.
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 124 decided by the Supreme Court in 1990,
exemplifies the difficulty of the Justice Department's steadfast adherence to unitariness. Metro Broadcasting called into question the constitutionality of FCC efforts to increase the number of minority
broadcasters through preference and set-aside programs. The case
was a political battlefield because Congress had statutorily mandated
the FCC to defend its preference, policy in the wake of Reagan FCC
See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text .
See Brief for Petitioner, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Coinm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 755
(1978) (No. 76-1471). The Department of Justice's views were presented in a separate brief.
See Brief for the United States, Nat'/ Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (No. 76-1471). For
further discussion of this conflict, see FCC Cross-Media Ban Backed, FACTS ON FILE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, June 23, 1978, at A3.
.
124 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
122

.123
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efforts to reexamine these affirmative action programs. 125 The FCC,
therefore, could not argue in its own name that its preference scheme
was constitutionally suspect. Further complicating this highly visible
litigation was Bush Solicitor General Kenneth Starr's commitment to
Reagan administration challenges to affirmative action. The initial
resolution was for the FCC and Solicitor General to jointly oppose
the grant of certiorari. 126 This effort, as the certiorari petition stated,
was designed to throw this political issue back to Congress, where
legislation repealing the preference might be enacted, and the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, where an apparent intracircuit conflict
might resolve itself through new judicial appointees. 127 It would also
enable the Solicitor General to avoid the issue of whether to allow the
FCC to independently assert its position before the Court. 128 Finally,
for supporters of preferences within the FCC and Solicitor General's
office, this strategy would keep the Court from placing another nail in
the affirmative action coffin. 129
Certiorari was granted, however. The Solicitor General prepared
to file a brief challenging the constitutionality of FCC preferences but
the question remained as to whether the FCC should be allowed to file
separately. By this time, the Commission, thanks to three propreference Commissioners named by President Bush, strongly supported
the preference program. 130
These Commissioners, in fact, sought to strong-arm the Justice
Department in Metro Broadcasting, arguing that they would file their
own brief before the Court with or without the Solicitor's authorization.131 Bush's appointment of propreference Commissioners while
he steadfastly encouraged his Justice Department to oppose racial
preferences is certainly contradictory and created a great dilemma for
a Solicitor General seeking to advance presidential interests. The ultimate resolution allowed the FCC to independently (and successfully)
defend its preferences before the Court, with the Solicitor filing an
amicus brief setting forth the executive's opposition to the FCC policy.132 The Solicitor's interest in opposing preferences in Metro
Broadcasting was as strong as it had beenin Sheet Metal Workers.
12s See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem fora Heavyweight, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 125 (1990).
126 See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453).
127 See id.
128 Interview with Tom Merrill, former Deputy Solicitor General (Sept. 16, 1992).
129 /d.
130 See Devins, supra note 125, at 152-53.
131 Interview with Tom Merrill, former Deputy Solicitor General (Sept. 16, 1992).
132 See Brief for the FCC, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-
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The FCC's threat to the Solicitor General's statutory authority also
raised the symbolic costs of acquiescence. In the end, however, the
unitary executive and ideological opposition to race preferences gave
way to political reality.
The question of why Bush would create this dilemma through his
FCC appointments remains. Against the backdrop of ongoing battles
between Reagan FCC appointees and the Congress, Bush's action appears politically expedient. 133 Reagan appointed FCC commissioners
who were committed to "unregulation," 134 caricatured the Commission as one of the "last of the New Deal dinosaurs,'' 135 and viewed
their jobs "as an important part of carrying out [the Reagan] mandate
for a leaner, less intrusive federal presence throughout this country. " 136 Congressional overseers, instead, admonished the Commissioners to follow their lead since they "take an oath to regulate, not
dereglilate." 137 These competing philosophies resulted in an all out
war-FCC appointees thought it "[im]possible to carry out the Reagan program and have amicable relations with Congress"; 138 oversight committee members thought "there [was] no way to 'overly
manage the commission,' " 139 for the FCC was "a renegade
agency" 140 that needed Congress to step in as an "active participant"141 and "bring them back." 142 Congress's bite was as good as its
bark: it enacted legislation at odds with Commission policy, including
funding bans freezing deregulatory initiatives and blocking Reagan's
appointment power by refusing to confirm FCC appointees for Reagan's last two years in office. 143 For its part, the FCC antagonized
Congress by, among other things, repealing the fairness doctrine and
raising doubts about the propriety of several other congressionally
453); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. (No. 89-453).
133 See generally Devins, supra note 18.
134 MarkS. Fowler, The Federal Communications Commission 1981-1987: What the Chairman Said, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 409, 414 (1988).
13S /d. at 411.
1 36 Id. at 410.
13 7 Congress Asserts its Dominion Over FCC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 7, 1989, at 27 (quoting
Commerce Committee Chairman Ernest Hollings).
138 Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay?, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56, 57
(quoting FCC Chairman Mark Fowler).
·139 /d. at 56 (quoting Larry Irving, Senior Counsel to the House Telecommunications
Subcommittee).
140 /d. (quoting David Leach, communications advisor to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman John Dingell).
141 /d. (quoting Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee).
14 2 /d. (quoting Tom Cohen, Senior Counsel to the Senate Commerce Committee).
143 See Devins, supra note 18.
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supported regulatory programs. 144
The battle over race preference exemplifies the bitterness of FCCCongress relations. When the Commission launched its reexamination of race preferences, it specifically requested comments on
"whether the [FCC] is bound by, or may rely upon[,] Congressional
findings of constitutionality." 145 Congress viewed this request as an
FCC attempt to "put itself above the Congress." 146 Congress's outrage was dramatically expressed at oversight hearings, subsequent to
the announced reexamination. Congressman John Bryant (D-Tex.)
characterized working with the Commission as "almost pointless"; 147
Congressman Mickey Leland (D:..Tex.) referred to the need to draft
"FCC proof" 148 legislation as well as the need to "fight this Commission tooth and nail"; 149 and Congressmap Edward Markey (D-Mass.)
labelled the reexamination "a cloudburst in a storm of suspicion and
distrust which seems to hover over this commission.mso To stop the
FCC reexamination in its tracks, Congress prohibited the FCC from
e~pending any funds on the reexamination. 151
2.

Comparing

t~e

FCC to the EEOC

Congress was a formidable opponent of the FCC. In contrast to
the EEOC where congressional threats could be dismissed, Congress
took a proprietary interest in the FCC. The Commission's independent status was not simply symbolic protection from an aggressive executive; it was a license for Congress to exert its will upon FCC policy
making. m For the 'Bush administration, telecommunications policy
hinged on the reestablishment of a dialogue between the FCC and
Congress. Bush sought to achieve this objective in many ways, including his sacrifice of ideological consistency on affirmative action.
The Solicitor General could not ignore Bush administration efforts to
normalize relations between Congress and the FCC. With the White
144 See id.
145 In re Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and
Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R.
1315, l318'{Dec. 22, 1986).
.
146 133 CONG. REC. 85494 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
147 Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications. Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on
H.R. 5373, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986).
14 8 Id. at 20.
149 Id.
ISO /d. at 22.
151 Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101_Stat. 1329-1332 (1987).
152 See Miller, supra note 18; Devins: supra note 18; Richard E. Wiley, "Political" Influence
at the FCC, 1988 DuKE L.J. 280.
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House both defending and opposing FCC preferences, it was appropriate that the Solicitor General too would sacrifice unitariness.
Department of Justice-FCC relations stand in dramatic contrast
to Department of Justice-EEOC relations. The Justice Department,
rather than endeavor to persuade the FCC that the government
should speak the unitary voice of the Justice Department, empowered
the FCC to speak its own voice. Indeed, not only were there no suggestions of the Justice Department seeking to assume FCC authority,
the FCC was the entity that sought to assume power as a matter of
right. Since both sets of conflicts involved race preference, the Justice
Department's assumption of power'in one case, -an<;I·concession of
power in the other, is all the more staggering.
·
Structural differe11:ces provide limited insight in explaining why
the FCC fared so much better than the EEOC. Although the FCC is
more insulated from the executive than the EEOC, and possesses
quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicatory powers, statuiory grants of
independent litigating authority favored the EEOC in Williams and
went against the. FCC in Metro Broadcasting. The principal difference
between the EEOC and FCC, instead, appears to be the political will
and culture of political expectations. Williams was a severe threat to
the Justice Department's authority, .with the Civil Rights Division
having exclusive control over state and local cases. Metro Broadcasting did not directly implicate the Justice Department's authority.
Congress's indifference to the EEOC's location in government and unwillingness to protect the E~OC also contributed to Department action in Williams. With respect to the FCC, Congress was an
extremely active and extraordinarily territorial player. Indeed, it effectively forced the FCC to defend racial preferences through appropriations legislation and political pressures on the Bush White House.
Bush's naming of propreference Commissioners, moreover, signalled
the Justice Departm~nt to leave the FCC alone in Metro Broadcasting.
In sharp contrast, the White House, in Williams, set up a meeting to
pressure EEOC officials to comply with Department o~ Justice arguments. That the EEOC complied reveals another difference between
Williams and Metro Broadcasting. The EEOC lacked a strong sense
of its institutional identity. It linked itself to the executive in 1978
and could not easily toss aside those shackles in 1983. However, the
FCC has always understood itself to be an independent agency.
Politics more than structure explains Metro Broadcasting as well
as the differences between the FCC and EEOC. The failure of the
government to speak a unitary voice in Metro Broadcasting also
reveals that political compromise makes policy coordination espe-

HeinOnline -- 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 305 1993 - 1994

306

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:273

cially difficult. Opposition to race preference did not lie at the heart
of the Bush administration's telecommunications policy and consequently was easily sacrificed. Political tradeoff's, however, are anathema to unitary approaches. To the extent that political tradeoff's are
inevitable, unitariness may well prove to be an elusive objective.
3.

The Postal Service

The Postal Service operates as an "independent establishment of
the executive branch." 153 The Board of Governors of the Postal Service, whose statutory charge is to "represent the public interest generally ... not ... specific interests[,]" 154 controls the Postal Service.
Eleven voting governors serve staggered nine-year terms to ensure
that no President can appoint more than four in a single term. Governors elect their own chair and appoint two of their own membersthe Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster General. The President's power is further weakened by the statutory requirement that no
more than five (of the nine) presidential appointees can be "adherents
of the same political party." 155 Most significant, the President can
only remove governors "for cause." 156
The Postal Service has some independent litigating authority,
although the statutory division between the Department of Justice
and Postal Service is murky. On rate-making disputes, the Postal Service has clear statutory authority to separate itself from the Justice
Department and act independently in court. 157 On other matters, the
statutory language is less clear. While requiring Attorney General
consent to Postal Service litigation, 158 the Department of Justice provides the Postal Service with legal representation as it may require,
and legislation requires that such legal representation be "deem[ed]
appropriate" by the Service. 159
Independent litigating authority in rate-making cases is critically
important to the Service. Rate-making disputes pit the Postal Service
against the Postal Rate Commission, an independent agency whose
153
ts4

iSS

156

39 u.s.c. § 201 (1988).
39 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988).
Jd.
/d.

39 u.s.c. §§ 3625, 3628 (1988); 28 u.s.c. § 2348 (1988).
39 u.s.c. § 409(d) (1988).
159 39 U.S.C. § 411 (1988); 39 U.S. C.§ 409(d) (1988). Court interpretations of§ 409(d) are
in conflict. Some support Postal Service control while others support Department of Justice
control. Compare Leonard v. United States Postal Serv., 489 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1974) (supporting Postal Service authority) with Friedlander v. United States Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp.
95 (D.D.C. 1987) (supporting Justice Department authority).
157

!58
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litigation is entrusted to the Attorney General. 160 Specifically, when
the Postal Service disagrees with Rate Commission decision making,
it may either reject the decision outright or accept the decision under
protest and then challenge it in court. 161 Under this scheme, courts
serve as arbitrators of Service-Commission disputes in rate-making
cases. Were the Attorney General to control Service representation,
he would serve as gatekeeper to such dispute resolution and thereby
could rule in favor of the Commission simply by declining to represent the Service in rate-making disputes. 162
Disputes between the Commission and Service do arise. The
question left unanswered is what role the Attorney General should
play in inserting executive branch interests into Service-Commission
dispute resolution. Bureaucratic theory demands adherence to the
statutory design and allows both sides to settle their differences in
court. In most instances, this is precisely the course taken by the Justice Department. The Department would either allow both sides to
represent themselves or would present the Service's position and attach a memorandum setting forth the Commission's opposing view. 163
Proponents of the unitary executive would follow a different
course. Indeed, the congressionally envisioned scheme of two independent entities resolving their policy disputes through litigation
titled United States Postal Service v. United States Postal Rate Commission is antithetical to unitary executive branch control. That this
scheme also presupposes dutiful Justice Department representation of
one of its independent agency clients is doubly offensive. How the
Department would exercise its disapproval is a bit more complex.
When the disagreement is with the Rate Commission, the Department can simply refuse to defend against the Postal Service action.
On the other hand, when the disagreement is with the Service, the
Department, aside from suggesting that the case is a nonjusticiable
intragovernmental dispute, 164 can apparently do very little.
160 The Commission, although designated an independent agency under 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(10) (1992), has no special statutory litigation authority and therefore must look to the
Attorney General for representation.
161 39 u.s.c. § 3625 (1988).
t62 The specification of Attorney General control over Rate Commission litigation creates
exactly this dilemma. The Attorney General, apparently, can undermine Rate Commission
decision making by refusing to defend the Commission against a Service challenge. At the
same time, statutory language authorizing Postal Service challenges to Commission rate making arguably grant the Commission a right to independently defend their decision.
163 See PRELIMINARY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 18.
164 Courts thus far do not seem at all troubled about adjudicating disputes between the
Service and the Commission. On the issue of intragovernmental litigation, see generally
Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991).
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Not so. On September 25, 1992, the Justice Department advised
the Postal Service that it could not represent itself in Governors of the
United States Postal Service v. Postal Rate Commission, an ongoing
Service-Commission rate-making dispute. 16' The Department argued
that it should broker disputes between the Postal Service and the Rate
Commission. 166 The Department of Justice's effort to become the
government's unitary voice on postal rule making failed. On November 9, the Service filed its brief for the cases. The Justice Department
was undeterred, filing a conflicting brief on behalf of the Postal Service. 167 At this point, the Justice Department sought to judicially
challenge the Postal Service's authority to litigate this dispute on its
own behalf. Like its efforts to flush the EEOC out of the Williams
litigation, however, Justice first sought to accomplish its objectives
through political means. Specifically, on December 11, 1992, George
Bush sent a memorandum to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon
"direct[ing]" the Postal Service to withdraw from its ongoing judicial
dispute with the Rate Commission. 168 This presidential "directive"
was undertaken "pursuant to [his] authority as Chief Executive and
[his] obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed." 169
On the same day, the Justice Department filed a letter with the D.C.
Circuit declaring that "the controversy has been resolved" and that
the unauthorized filings of the Postal Service "will be withdrawn." 170
Three weeks later, on the very day that the Board of Governors was
to vote on whether to comply with the directive, the President sent a
letter to each governor threatening that if his directive was not complied with "[he would] if necessary exercise [his] authority to remove
governors of the Postal Service." 171
16S See Motion of the United States Postal Service for Leave to Appear as a Party on its
Own Behalf at 3, Mail Order Ass'n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-1058); Mail Order Ass'n, 986 F.2d at 511. The Postal Service dispute
with the Commission spawned two separate lawsuit~ne suit involved a Postal Service challenge to the Commission, and the second suit concerned a private mailer challenge to the
Service's opposition to Commission decision making. The Justice Department brief was filed
in the second suit. The two suits were linked in the Postal Service's motion for selfrepresentation.
166 /d.
167 The Justice Department brief endorsed Rate Commission decision making over Postal
Service objections. Technically, the Rate Commission was not a party to the matter briefed by
the Justice Department.
168 Memorandum from President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon
(Dec. 11, 1992) (on file with the author).
169

/d.

Letter from Jacob M. Lewis, Civil Division Attorney, to Ron Garvin, Clerk, U.S. Court
of Appeals .for the D.C. Circuit (Dec. 11, 1992) (on file with the author).
171 Letter from President George Bush to Bert Mackie, Governor, U.S. Postal Service (Jan.
4, 1993) (on file with the author).
170
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These White House and Justice Department ~maneuverings were
truly extraordinary. The President's assertion that he could "direct"
Postal Service decision making was squarely grounded in his authority as "Chief Executive" over a unitary government. This bold assertion was the only option available to the President. The
acknowledgement of Postal Service independence would have kept
the issue in court where the Justice Department and Postal Service
were prepared to battle over the Service's litigation authority. This
was a dispute that the Justice Department was unlikely to win. The
constitutionality of statutory grants of litigating authority to entities
outside the President's control appears beyond question. 172 In other
words, as was probably the case with Williams, the only way for the
Executive to win this battle was to place political pressure on the Postal Service.
The Postal Service, however, is far more independent than the
EEOC with respect both to structure and political expectations. Issues of concurrent jurisdiction and the intermingling of functions do
not beset the Postal Service as they do the EEOC. Unlike the EEOC,
moreover, the Postal Service performs quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicatory tasks. In fact, the President is more constrained in his control of the Postal Service than of the FCC. The Board of Governors
select their chair as well as the Postmaster and Deputy Postmaster
Generals, the two officials principally responsible for the Service's
day-to-day operations. 173 With the Postmaster and Deputy Postmaster Generals voting on most Board matters, 174 the President's direct
influence over the Board is further diminished.
Congressional expectations of Postal. Service independence also
distinguish the Postal Service from the EEOC. In 1970, the Postal
Service was, in the words of then President Richard Nixon, removed
from the President's cabinet and made an "independent establishment
. . . freed from direct political pressures:ms To ensure "independen[ce] of ordinary legislative and executive supervision and
172 See Olson, supra note 7; Attorney General as Chief Litigator, supra note 12; Devins,
supra note 12. At the same time, Justice Department claims that the Postal Service was without statutory authority to represent its interests in court-although ultimately unsuccessfulwere not without force. See Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush
White House's Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
·
Apr. 1994).
173 Presidentially appointed governors serve in a part·time capacity, typically only a few
days each month.
17 4 Rate-making decisions ~e exclusively within the province of the Board.
175 The President's Message to the Congress Recommending Postal Reorganization and
Pay Legislation, 6 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 532, 533 (Apr. 16, 19!0).
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control," 176 as the Senate Report put it, the Board of Governors was
exempted from "Federal laws ... which in most instances apply to
Government agencies and functions." 177 The House Report likewise
noted that the 1970 Reorganization "seals off the Postal Service from
political influence ... by establishing institutional buffers between the
President and the Congress .... " 178 Congress then envisioned a Postal Service with greater independence from outside control than either
the EEOC or FCC. The 1970 Postal Reorganization, unlike the executive initiated and legislatively approved 1978 EEOC Reorganization,
removed the Postal Service and its functions from partisan influence.
The Postal Service response to the President's directive matched
its structure and political expectations. Although nearly breaking in
the face of intense White House pressure, the Service ultimately held
its own. By a 6-5 vote, the Board of Governors refused to withdraw
its self-representation motion.t'9 Instead, on January 7, 1993, the
noncomplying governors successfully sought a preliminary injunction
against the President, blocking their threatened removal. 180 Moreover, before the President could successfully stack the governors in
his favor with a questionable recess appointment, 181 the D.C. Circuit
heard arguments on Postal Service self-representation (on January 14)
and decided (on January 15) that the Postal Service had a right to
have its views aired on rate-making matters. 182
The failure of the White House's unitariness campaign in this
instance is due to both structure and politics. Structural limitations
on the President's removal authority, the absence of any presidential
role in selecting two governors (the Postmaster General and Deputy
176

POSTAL REORGANIZATION, S. REP. No. 912, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
!d. at 5.
178 POSTAL REORGANIZATION AND SALARY ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No.
1104, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
179 See Bill McAllister, Divided Postal Board Seeks to Forestall Firings, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6,
1993, at A IS; Michael York, Bush Blocked from Firing Postal Board, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8,
1993, at AI. The vote was 7-4 but one of the majority Governors changed his vote the day
after the original vote.
180 See York, supra note 179.
181 See Michael York & Stephen Barr, Bush Appoints Supporter in Postal Board Dispute,
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at Al. The suspect nature of this recess appointment is revealed in
a letter sent by Senate leaders to President Bush, as well as in papers filed by Postal Service
Governors in court. See Letter from George Mitchell et al. to President George Bush (Jan. 12,
1993) (on file with author); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Bert H. Mackie et al. v. George Bush and Thomas
Ludlow Ashley, Civ. No. 93-0032-LFO (Jan. 15, 1993). On July 24, 1993, D.C. District Judge
John Oberdorfer invalidated the recess appointment. Bill McAllister, Bush's Recess Appointment Voided, WASH. PoST, July 26, 1993, at AIS.
182 See Bill McAllister, Appeals Court Rejects Bush's Assertion of Control Over Postal Service, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1993, at A6.
1 77
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Postmaster General), and a statutory grant of ind,ependent litigating
authority, bolstered the Postal Service position. The closeness of the
governors' vote, however, reveals that the President was nearly successful despite these structural constraints. In fact, a majority of five
of the nine presidentially-appointed governors voted to comply with
the directive. 183 A majority of six of the eleven governors, moreover,
would have voted to follow the directive had the President filled a
vacancy on the Board of Governors in a timely fashion. 184
The Bush administration's failure to succeed in the Postal Service dispute is largely attributable to poor political judgment. The
President should not have waited until a crisis emerged before he
sought to fill a Board vacancy. This sluggishness certainly limited his
influence over the governors. Even more striking was the horrendous
timing of the President's directive. Rather than lay the foundation for
its opposition to independent Postal Service advocacy at roughly the
time that the Service filed its claim, the administration waited almost
twenty months before launching its offensive. The D.C. Circuit expressed disapproval of this foot dragging in an order on December 8,
1992, and it is unlikely that these stall tactics enamored the Service's
Board of Governors. 185
The Bush directive also came a month after his electoral defeat.
The brevity of his remaining time in office certainly cabined the President's ability to work his political will. For example, if the President
had more time, he could have engaged the governors in some type of
dialogue before resorting to the threat of removal. By threatening removal and naming a recess appointee in his last days in office, the
White House action was the subject of sharp attack in the press and in
Congress. 186 Whether this political firestorm enhanced Postal Service
resistance or made the D.C. Circuit skeptical of Department of Justice arguments is hard to know; what is clear is that this political
firestorm did not help the President.
The Postal Service dispute, like the EEOC and FCC disputes, is
one of politics. Structure, undoubtedly, also played a tremendous role
in shaping the tugs and pulls between the Postal Service and the
183 A fifth governor, Tirso Del Junco, voted to follow the directive on January 7, 1993.
McAllister, supra note 179.
18 4 This assertion assumes that in the fall of 1992, the President would have appointed and
the Senate confirmed a governor willing to comply with the directive.
tss Mail Order Assoc. of Amer. v. Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
186 See Letter to the President from George Mitchell et al. (Jan. 12, 1993) (on file with
author); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Two Cents Plain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at
A17; Tempest in an Envelope, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1993, at A20. ·
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White House. Yet,· the stocy of Postal Service independence turns on
the effective exercise of political will-or its absence.

Ill. CONCLUSION
The paradigm of agency independence which naturally follows
from these case studies holds interesting implications for all types of
federal agencies. It suggests that agency independence is necessarily
qualified. Independence from the executive may mean dependence
upon the Congress. Furthermore, independence from the executive,
may be temporal-depending on shifting White House attitudes towards unitariness or cqmpeting policy demands that yield disunitariness in interpretation.
The EEOC example should serve as a warning to independent
federal agencies that their ability to assert their independence is by no
means secure. While few agencies will face the identity crisis that the
EEOC did, the EEOC case suggests that even those agencies that feel
generally secure in their independent status may on occasion be unable to voice that independence if faced with an executive assertion of
power and a congressional failure to act.
The FCC and Postal Service examples, in contrast, point to limits on the executive's ability to speak a unitary voice. The FCC overcame structural limitations and asserted its own position in Metro
Broadcasting thanks to competing policy agendas within the Bush
White House. The Postal Service withstood a furious White House
effort to sap its independent litigating authority because the President's plan was unsystematic in design and frantic in its execution.
The sagas of the EEOC, FCC, and Postal Service indicate that
agency independence is a fluid and slippery thing. Certainly, structural analysis of federal agencies fails to do justice to the power of
politics and the politics of power. These studies suggest a model of
agency analysis which emphasizes the complex dynamics that characterize the administrative state.
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